


Eagle Values Education Program in an Operational Context

This section will discuss the key to unlocking the potential for unit cohesion and performance. For the last two hundred years the great armies of the world have labored at building the courage of individual soldiers and linking the strength for unit *esprit*. This is not necessarily a lost art, but one that is in danger of being overshadowed by the revolution in military affairs in the realm of technological developments.

A military force can be depicted as consisting of three domains: Physical, Cybernetic and Moral. These domains collectively produce the combat power of a military organization. The figure below represents the three domains in relation to time and relative combat power generated.



The arc on the graph represents a military organization in a state of relative stability. Enemy forces attempt to destabilize the organization by synchronizing attacks across all three domains resulting in driving the organization from stability into chaos. As an organization is driven further from stability, it must commit increasing amounts of resources to function effectively. Eventually, successful enemy attacks will cause an organization to become unable to maintain any degree of stability after all resources are exhausted. The subsequent chaotic collapse rewards the enemy with victory. Our aim will be to strengthen the Moral Domain, which is the highest attribute in this combat power model. The following discussion will define the domains.

The Physical Domain is comprised of military hardware and logistics. Artillery, tanks, aircraft, seagoing vessels represent a portion of the hardware that contributes to combat power. The Physical Domain also includes ancillary hardware such as railroads, seaports, munitions facilities, depots and weapons production facilities. Elements of this domain are tangible. Enemy attacks on this domain result in the destruction of the fighting force. As hardware is destroyed, the Physical Domain will be proportionally

reduced in relative power and the organization must commit more resources to maintain stability.

The Cybernetic Domain represents the organization of the military forces. Command and control, communications, intelligence, and the orders process are all examples of this domain. Enemy attacks on this domain will result in a degree of disorganization of the forces. Effective attacks on Saddam Hussain's communications network in Baghdad resulted in his inability to position his forces effectively in response to the allied flanking maneuvers.

“Military Virtues of the Army: Obedience, order, rule and method are achieved by training, practicing, thinking and training in privation.”

- Carl von Clausewitz On War

The Moral Domain is clearly the most difficult to achieve. Simply stated, it is what causes a soldier to voluntarily engage the enemy in battle. It is here that our program is aimed. Strong belief in mission, physical courage and trust in the unit are what build moral character in a unit. The hand-to-hand combat between US Marines and the Japanese on the island of Pelelu during the Second World War is an example of strong moral conviction on both sides. Both had the will to continue the prolonged battle across the uneven terrain and into enemy-infested tunnels. Will is the desire to act and is

countered by danger, exertion, uncertainty and chance. It is influenced by the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and, their patriotic spirit. If a soldier feels that he or she is being treated fairly within a military organization, then that soldier will be more willing to face the unknowns of combat. The enemy focuses on demoralizing the unit to break the spirit of the soldiers. In Vietnam this was done through Dau Tranh, the concept that all are combatants. Ho Chi Minh turned the US population against the war and caused a moral collapse stateside.

Without communications between soldiers in units, the moral disintegration of the line is for the moment complete.

- S.L.A. Marshall Men Against Fire

Military organizations can build the moral domain using several techniques that have been documented as successful by armies dating back to the reign of Frederick the Great of Prussia. The first is building unit esprit. Initially this was fostered by the regimental system in Napoleonic Europe. Units were composed of primary groups that were aligned with military goals. Loyalty to the primary group was supplemented by commitment to the wider entity of the regiment. Esprit is also strengthened by incorporating celebrations of traditions and by engaging in competitions.

Realistic training is vital component of the Moral Domain. Leaders must train soldiers to be confident in themselves and in their equipment, and, know that both will function in combat. To build this confidence the training must be a product of the battlefield environment to familiarize soldiers with the danger and uncertainty of the environment. Establishing individual and collective battle drills for automatic response in combat will greatly increase confidence. Soldiers with an accurate preconception of combat will perform more efficiently than soldiers that are shocked and surprised by the environment.

Leadership is the key to building the Moral Domain. In training and combat, panic is contagious. Leaders must display their own confidence, but must also continue to reflect on the situation, especially at higher echelons, to make sound courageous decisions. They should temper their desire for mission accomplishment with the concern for unit integrity and well being.


A unit that has a moral leader, that is the product of realistic combat training and has high esprit and morale will resist the fatigue, climate, terrain, casualties and other aspects of combat. Concentrating on building a strong Moral Domain will add the soldier aspect to combat power.

Determining how to build the program to strengthen this aspect is a key to success. The next section illustrates in combat arms terminology, an example campaign plan to combat ignorance and build the moral domain.

Our Campaign Plan to combat hatred, ignorance and lack of respect.

Hans Delbruck developed a theory during the 19th Century to depict two types of campaign plans depending upon the strength of friendly and enemy forces. He titled them the campaign theory of exhaustion and the theory of annihilation. The theories were based on Clausewitz's discussion on the appropriate linkage of a series of battles and engagements to ultimately destroy an army. This model is representative in our campaign to provide a moral and considerate command climate throughout Fort Campbell.


Delbruck theorized that for a fairly strong friendly force and a weaker enemy, the theory of annihilation would lead to an effective defeat of the enemy forces. This theory, as depicted in the diagram below, right, is characterized by small maneuvers followed by a single climactic battle to annihilate the force. An example of this campaign theory could be General Lee's intention to smash the Union Army at Gettysburg Pennsylvania in



1863.

The theory of exhaustion is depicted prior page, left. It involves a lengthy series of maneuvers and small battles and engagements to wear down the enemy, followed by a smaller climactic battle to destroy the enemy. An example of this campaign theory was General Grant's peninsular campaign in 1865, when he maneuvered and engaged the Confederate Army, exhausting an already depleted army to defeat.

In structuring our campaign plan, it is important to complete a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield. This is done through focus groups, surveys and observation of troops and units. A comparison to society is also warranted, since the military is generated from society. Although we have made great positive strides in reducing discrimination in the military, much work must still be done to educate our young officers and soldiers in human relations. We must plan a strategy of exhaustion, engaging often and across a wide front. Having a single climactic battle and declaring victory would not be appropriate nor effective given the resilient nature of the enemy.



Above is an example campaign plan for a division and installation-level Human Relations Training Program. The Commanding General's guidance on 15 December 99 was as follows: I want a campaign plan that attacks along two parallel, mutually supporting and nonlinear axis:

- division and post sponsored events and training
- division assessments

Additionally I want to insert training requirements for all subordinate units IAW the timelines in FM 25-100 and FM 25-101. The endstate will be a more positive EO climate that is measured through various methods.

Given the CG's guidance, the staff developed the above plan. In order to educate the senior leaders on the new AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, the CG presented a class at the Brigade Commanders Luncheon early in January. This class highlighted critical changes in the new regulation in the areas of Equal Opportunity and fraternization. For a fresh assessment of the entire post, the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey will be conducted in March. Another key area instituted by the Inspector General is the Trend Analysis Group which is staffed by the IG, Chaplain, EO, EEO, CID, MPI, JAG and G1. The intent is to determine if trends exist at the level of these agencies and provide input into the overall assessment process. Command inspections also provide opportunities for focus groups and training inspections, all of which provide input. After a degree of certainty is attained through local sampling, combined with the results of the MEOCS, the units will review and develop affirmative action plans for areas that need attention.

Regarding training, the installation will recognize the DoD directed ethnic observance months with educational programs that form the basis for follow-on small unit discussions. The CG directed brigade-level and below training beginning second quarter with updated guidance on frequency with the changes in AR 600-20. He directed EO training to be conducted quarterly, POSH to be conducted quarterly and CO2 monthly. He directed units conduct training in perceptions and stereotyping along with conflict resolution semiannually as a result of input from focus groups conducted late in 1999. The division will also conduct its semiannual CG EO seminar in August.

The capstone event will be the end of year assessment. It will analyze data from samples throughout the year along with training evaluations to determine the way ahead for the upcoming year.

This example campaign plan is applicable to company level. As stated earlier, the enemy must be engaged frequently. Often the temptation is to hold a single event and claim victory. This technique is too often the one of choice but has shown not to provide lasting results. At all echelons the sampling and training should occur at intervals that capture the greatest audience available and equally address all aspects of the entire program.

How do we as leaders start the process with our soldiers? Let us start with each new soldier that arrives at our unit. Let them know up-front what the unit's values and goals are. The next section illustrates the arrival of a new soldier to his or her unit.

Inprocessing New Soldiers

CPT Kelly is commanding HSB 1-320 FA. He received three new soldiers on Thursday and they are scheduled to see him that afternoon. As he received them in his office he talked to each of them about where they were arriving from and what their expectations and concerns were. CPT Kelly talked about the history of the battalion and the historical 320th Field Artillery Regiment. He discussed what the unit goals were and what his vision picture was for the unit. He discussed the Army Values and the EVEP. Two of the soldiers did not have the Army Values Cards and Tags so he presented each

with a set. The soldiers signed for the tags as an informal contract between themselves and the Commander to subscribe to those values and those of the unit. As the soldiers departed CPT Kelly thought for a minute about the organizational values and how far his unit must go to reach the collective goals.

This type of dialogue is critical for commanders of all levels and their incoming officers, NCOs and soldiers. Not only does it present an azimuth for the individual for personal performance and interpersonal relations, it allows commanders to internally assess the units progress towards its goals. The process is not limited to commanders. Staff sections, fire support sections, shop offices all can benefit from discussing the collective goals and values. The aim is to reduce tensions within the organization through open discussions.

You are now ready as a commander or noncommissioned officer to prepare to assess and plan EVEC training for your unit. Use the enclosed lessons as they are presented or develop your own to satisfy your unit needs. Above all, prepare to embark on a long-term campaign to increase the combat potential of your unit!